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In the second chapter of The Time-Image, Deleuze addresses the 
conditions of possibility of a semiology of cinema. These conditions 
depend on the relations between cinema and language: under what 
conditions can cinematic images and signs be understood as a language? 
In other words, (how) can cinematic images and signs be inscribed in the 
discursive plane of the signifiable? Discussing Christian Metz’s 
semiological approach of cinema, Deleuze argues that the structural 
conditions of linguistics and of post-Saussurian semiology cannot 
adequately render intelligible the specificity of cinematic semiosis. 
Drawing on Louis Hjelmslev’s semiotics, Deleuze redefines the specificity 
of a relation of designation distinct from a relation of signification 
(strictly linguistic), a specificity that concerns the fact that the 
designative relation is antecedent and heterogeneous to any signifying 
relation. Put differently, the very constitution of the sign is redefined: in 
opposition to semiology, semiotics becomes the study of images and signs 
as (1) being independent of language in general and (2) expressing a 
“non-language material”. This article explicates the importance of 
Hjelmslev’s semiotic theory in The Time-Image by offering a detailed 
account of the constitution of the sign in Hjelmslev’s Prolegomena to a 
Theory of Language and by tracing Deleuze’s earlier appreciation of 
Hjelmslev in Anti-Oedipus and its intricate relation to his appreciation of 
Jean-François Lyotard’s theory of designation in Discourse Figure.     
1. Introduction 
In his two books on cinema Deleuze conceptualizes the image as 
marked by an essential duality. The image is never merely visible, but 
also legible: it shows us an object of sensation and gives rise to an idea 
or a thought. The cinematic image is an intentionally framed, 
composed set of bodies, characters, parts, aspects, dimensions, 
distances, etc. that give the image an aboutness, a whatness or as 
Deleuze puts it, a “content”. Through the act of framing, the image 
becomes a relatively closed system that gives a common standard of 
Itinera, N. 11, 2016. Pagina 50 
 
measurement to the things present in it. In this sense the film presents 
itself as a text, a narration. In order to avoid falling into an empty 
aestheticism each point of view that a frame gives requires a certain 
explanation or justification, it must be revealed as normal or regular. 
All the different composed sets must, to meet this first characteristic of 
the image, be integrated into a homogeneous continuity, a universe or 
a plane of principally unlimited content. 
 It seems to follow from this, that the sequence of images, or even 
every single image, every single shot, can be assimilated to 
propositions or rather oral utterances: the shot as the smallest 
narrative utterance. In his second book on cinema, The Time-Image, 
Deleuze devotes an introductory passage to the semiologist Christian 
Metz who had dealt, before him, with precisely this relation between 
cinema and language. Deleuze notes that this passage is not merely a 
pause between the two books «but an opportunity to deal with the most 
pressing problem»1, namely that of the relation between cinema and 
language. The approach of this relation determines the second 
characteristic of the image, which is to express a “non-language-
material”2 that is presupposed by every language system and that is, 
moreover, heterogeneous to it. Contrary to Metz, Deleuze argues that 
the constitution of the cinematic sign cannot adequately be explained 
by means of the structural conditions of linguistics and post-
Saussurian semiology, because the cinematic image’s legibility, its 
content, is essentially tied to and motivated by the «pre-verbal 
intelligible content»3 that it expresses. This non-linguistically formed 
                                                            
1 G. Deleuze, Cinema 2. L’image-temps, Les Éditions de Minuit, Paris 1985, p. 38 / G. 
Deleuze, Cinema 2. The Time-Image (1985), transl. by H. Tomlinson, R. Galeta, Uni-
versity of Mineapolis Press, Minneapolis 1997, p. 25. Henceforth abbreviated as IT, 
with French/English page numbers. 
2 IT, p. 45 / p. 29.  
3 G. Deleuze, “Preface to the English edition”, in Cinema 1. The Movement-Image 
(1983), transl. by H. Tomlinson, B. Habberjam, University of Mineapolis Press, Min-
neapolis 1997, p. iv.  
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content is said to be a «signaletic material»4 that includes sensory 
(visual and sonic), kinetic, intensive, affective, rhythmic, tonal, and 
even verbal (oral and written) modulation features. While the act of 
framing must always limit the expressive and connotative traits of this 
material, ensuring a certain «deterritorialisation of the image»5, the 
cinematic sign is always constructed upon a simultaneous 
reinvestment of this «plastic mass» or «a-signifying and a-syntaxic 
material» that is «not formed linguistically even though it is not 
amorphous and is formed semiotically, aesthetically and 
pragmatically»6. Thus, what Deleuze puts into question in the passage 
on Metz is the kind of semiotics required for the analysis of cinematic 
signification. What he calls for is a «pure semiotics»7 that considers 
cinema as a system of pre-linguistic images and signs. 
 Throughout both books, this project consists in grounding the 
ontology underlying this dual nature of the image, starting from four 
commentaries on Bergson, a classification of images and signs inspired 
by Peirce’s semiotics, and finally the theme of the power of the false in 
Nietzsche’s differential thought. Summarizing this in a late interview 
Deleuze declares having «attempted to make a book of logic, a logic of 
cinema»8 just as much as a history of cinema. This declaration can be 
taken to designate a logic of signs and images, to the extent that 
cinema is «a composition of images and signs»9. Deleuze’s primary 
sources for this classification of images and signs are undoubtedly 
Bergson’s equation of image and matter in Matter and Memory and 
Peirce’s conception of the sign. Yet, one cannot neglect the fact that the 
                                                            
4 IT, p. 43 / p. 29. 
5 G. Deleuze, Cinema 1. L’image-mouvement, Les Éditions de Minuit, Paris 1983, p. 
27 / G. Deleuze, Cinema 1. The Movement-Image (1983), transl. by H. Tomlinson, B. 
Habberjam, University of Mineapolis Press, Minneapolis 1997, p. 15. Henceforth ab-
breviated as IM, with French/English page numbers.  
6 IT, p. 44 / p. 29. 
7 IT, p. 50 / p. 34. 
8 G. Deleuze, “Sur l’image-mouvement”, in Pourparlers, Les Éditions de Minuit, Paris 
1990, p. 68. 
9 G. Deleuze, “Préface to the English edition”, cit., p. iv.  
Itinera, N. 11, 2016. Pagina 52 
 
mentioned passage on the relation between cinema and language is 
critical of Peirce, and that from this point on all reference to the father 
of pragmatism disappears. Deleuze declares to «take the term “sign” in 
a completely different way from Peirce»10 and ascribes to the Danish 
linguist Louis Hjelmslev the important innovation of having integrated 
non-linguistically formed matter or sense (“purport”) into semiotic 
analysis. It seems to us that an orthodox reading of Peirce cannot offer 
a profound, comprehensive understanding of Deleuze’s account of the 
constitution of cinematic signs. A paper dealing with Deleuze’s cinema 
books as a semiotics of images and signs, should rather turn to 
Hjelmslev’s semiotic theory, which is capable of appreciating the 
deictic, connotative and demonstrative dimension of signs and its 
autonomy with regard to their signifying and symbolizing powers. 
 Through the lens of Hjelmslev’s semiotics, Deleuze’s regime of 
cinematic images and signs will become clearly distinguishable from a 
signifying regime satisfying the structural conditions of linguistics and 
post-Saussurian semiology. It is this distinction, concerning the 
constitution of the cinematic and linguistic sign, which this article 
explicates. It will do so proceeding in two steps. We will begin by 
offering a detailed account of the constitution of the linguistic sign in 
Hjelmslev’s Prolegomena to a Theory of Language. Subsequently, its 
conceptual importance in The Time-Image will be traced back to 
Deleuze’s earlier appreciation of Hjelmslev in Anti-Oedipus, where his 
linguistics is staged together with Lyotard’s Discourse Figure as the 
general paradigm for a post-structuralist theory of a-signifying, “pure 
designation”.  
2. Hjelmslev’s semiotic net 
To consider cinema as a system of signs seems an evident proposition. 
What to understand by sign, however, is dependent on the theory in 
                                                            
10 IT, p. 48 / p. 32.  
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question. The traditional realist definition tells us that a sign – or to 
anticipate a distinction that will be introduced further on, the 
expression of a sign – is first of all a sign of something else. A sign is in 
this sense defined as a function: it signifies, designates, functions. As 
opposed to a non-sign, a sign is a carrier of signification.  
 From a linguistic point of view a first error to be avoided is to 
conceive the sign as an expression of a content that is exterior to 
the sign itself. This traditional, realist conception of the sign is 
from a linguistic point of view untenable. Modern linguists such as 
Ferdinand de Saussure and Louis Hjelmslev conceive the sign 
rather as a whole consisting of content and expression11. In 
Saussurian terms, the sign consists of a signified (content) and a 
signifier (expression). The linguistic sign does not signify a content 
that is external to it, but it is constituted by an interaction or 
isomorphic relation between a (conceptual) content plane and a 
(phonic) expression plane. The semiotic “function”, which is the 
sign or “sign function”, must thus be considered as a function that 
is “contracted” between two planes or “functives” that can be 
characterized as thought and speech, or concept and sound. 
Essential to this conception of the sign is that both “sides” can only 
be defined “reciprocally”, in relation to one another: 
The semiotic function is in itself a solidarity. Expression and content 
are solidary – they necessarily presuppose each other. An expression 
is expression only by virtue of being an expression of a content, and 
a content is content only by virtue of being a content of an 
expression. Therefore – except by an artificial isolation – there can 
be no content without an expression, or expressionless content; 
neither can there be an expression without a content, or content-less 
expression. If we think without speaking, the thought is not a 
linguistic content and not a functive for a sign function. If we speak 
without thinking, and in the form of series of sounds to which no 
                                                            
11 Cfr. L. Hjelmslev, Prolégomènes à une théorie du langage (1943), transl. by U. Can-
ger, Les Éditions de Minuit, Paris 1971, pp. 65-79 / L. Hjelmslev, Prolegomena to a 
Theory of Language (1943), transl. by F.J. Whitfield, The University of Wisconsin 
Press, Madison 1963, pp. 47-60. Henceforth abbreviated as PTL, with French/English 
page numbers. See also: F. de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale, Ch. Bally & 
Alb. Sechehaye (ed.), Payot, Paris 1964, pp. 97-103.  
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content can be attached by any listener, such speech is an 
abracadabra, not a linguistic expression and not a functive for a sign 
function.12 
What interests Deleuze in Hjelmslev’s linguistics is a second 
differentiation he makes, viz. between form, substance and what he 
calls “sense” or “purport”: both content and expression can be 
further analyzed into form, substance and purport. On this second 
level of abstraction, the interaction between content and 
expression, that’s to say, the emergence of signs, is considered not 
only in relation to thought and sound but in relation to that which 
is thought of and expressed. Hjelmslev introduces this second 
differentiation in his critical commentary of the following passage 
in de Saussure’s Courses on «language as organized thought 
coupled with phonic matter»: 
To prove that language is only a system of pure values, it is enough 
to consider the two elements involved in its functioning: ideas and 
sounds. Psychologically our thought – apart from its expression in 
words –is only a shapeless and indistinct mass. Philosophers and 
linguists have always agreed on the fact that without the help of 
signs we would be unable to make a clear-cut, consistent distinction 
between two ideas. Taken in itself, without language, thought is like 
a vague, uncharted nebula. There are no pre-existing ideas, and 
nothing is distinct before the appearance of language. (…) The 
phonic substance is neither more fixed nor more rigid than thought; 
it is not a mold into which thought must of necessity fit but a plastic 
substance divided in turn into distinct parts to furnish the signifiers 
that thought requires. We can therefore represent (…) language as a 
series of contiguous subdivisions marked off on both the indefinite 
plane of confused ideas (A) and the equally vague plane of sounds 
(B); (…) language works out its units while taking shape between 
two shapeless masses (…); their combination produces a form, not a 
substance.13 
These Saussurian relations between signified, signifier, substance and 
form can be summarized schematically as follows: 
 
                                                            
12 PTL, pp. 66-67 / pp. 48-49. 
13 F. de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale, cit., pp. 155-157 (my translation). 
Cfr. PTL, pp. 67-68 / pp. 49-50. 
Itinera, N. 11, 2016. Pagina 55 
 
 SUBSTANCE FORM 
SIGNIFIED 
(content) 
indefinite plane of confused ideas; 
unformed thought mass 
determined plane of ideas; 
conceptual order 
SIGNIFIER 
(expression) 
indeterminate plane of sounds 
determined plane of sounds; 
phonic order 
 
Table 1: de Saussure’s signified-signifier distinction 
 
Language’s function consists for Saussure not in creating a material, 
phonic means for the expression of pre-existing ideas, but to serve as 
an intermediary between thought and phonic expression, in such a way 
that their union enables reciprocal delimitations of unities. In other 
words, one should not conceive language as a materialization of 
preformed thoughts or a spiritualization of sounds, but rather 
language (“la pensée-son”) elaborates its unities in constituting itself 
between two amorphous masses. What strikes Hjelmslev in this 
passage is the way in which Saussure considers the “content-
substance” (thought taken “in itself”, “chaotic by nature”) and 
“expression-substance” (indistinct phonic chain) before the apparition 
of language. By having these two planes “in themselves” precede the 
apparition of language, whether chronologically or hierarchically, 
Saussure considers the expression and content planes separately from 
their linguistic form function. Hjelmslev points out that if one follows 
Saussure’s own intuitions, one must account for the fact that substance 
depends exclusively on form. Accordingly, one cannot attribute any 
independent existence to substance, independent of language: «In a 
science that avoids unnecessary postulates there is no basis for the 
assumption that content-substance (thought) or expression-substance 
(sound-chain) precede language in time or hierarchical order, or vice 
versa»14.  
                                                            
14 PTL, p. 68 / p. 50.  
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 What is legitimate, on the other hand, is to compare different 
languages and to extract a factor that is common to all of them while 
abstracting from the structural principle of signification itself, which is 
the linguistic function. «This common factor», Hjelmslev writes, «will 
be defined only by its having function to the structural principle of 
language and to all the factors that make languages different from one 
another»15. Hjelmslev calls this common factor “purport” (“sens”). Since 
this concept designates something that falls outside of the structure of 
signification itself, this means in reverse that it can only be defined in 
terms of its linguistic function. Let us consider this point in more 
detail. 
 Within the content plane, purport refers to unformed and 
unanalyzed thought: «an amorphous mass, an unanalyzed entity»16. 
Hjelmslev explains the notion as that factor of the content of a sign 
that is common to different languages: it can be seen as a type of sense 
that can be taken as a basis for comparing different signs in different 
languages. He gives the following example17: 
 
a. jeg véd det ikke  (Danish) 
b. I do not know  (English) 
c. je ne sais pas  (French) 
d. en tiedä   (Finnish) 
e. naluvara   (Eskimo) 
 
                                                            
15 Ibidem (my italics). 
16 PTL, p. 69 / p. 50. Miriam Taverniers notes in a detailed, instructive reading of 
Hjelmslev’s Prolegomena that content-purport corresponds to the Kantian noumenon 
or “Ding an sich”. She refers for this point to P.J. Thibault, Re-reading Saussure. The 
Dynamics of Signs in Social Life. Routledge, London 1997, p. 168. For Husserl’s phe-
nomenological re-interpretation of Kant’s noumenon we are referred to: K. Willems, 
Sprache, Sprachreflexion und Erkenntniskritik. Versuch einer transzendental-
phänomenologischen Klärung der Bedeutungsfrage. Gunter Narr, Tübingen 1994, pp. 
40-50. Cfr. M. Taverniers, “Hjelmslev’s semiotic model of language: An exegesis”, Se-
miotica, 171 (2008), p. 37. 
17 PTL, p. 69 / p. 50.  
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The content-purport in these expressions is the meaning factor they 
have in common, i.e. “the thought itself” or the “sense” of the 
proposition. To analyze and define it, for example from a psychological 
or logical point of view, one must articulate it, form it in a specific way, 
bound to a specific language. Accordingly, the sense or the thought 
itself must be analyzed differently according to the particular way it is 
articulated. Hjelmslev repeatedly emphasizes this point: it is possible 
to “extract” an unformed purport from the different expressions, but 
this purport itself cannot be labeled. As soon as we attempt to do so, 
the purport is being formed in one way or another, and then we regard 
it from the perspective of a particular language, or in Hjelmslev’s 
terms: as a content-substance. Moreover, the “unformed sense” that 
can be extracted from the linguistic chains takes form in each language 
in a different way. Each language puts up its territorial boundaries on 
the “amorphous thought mass” in a different way and in doing so it 
values or qualifies it differently:  
Each language lays down its own boundaries within the amorphous 
“thought-mass” and stresses different factors in it in different 
arrangements, puts the centers of gravity in different places and gives 
them different emphases. It is like one and the same handful of sand that 
is formed in quite different patterns, or like the cloud in the heavens that 
changes shape in Hamlet’s view from minute to minute. Just as the same 
sand can be put into different molds, and the same cloud take on ever 
new shapes, so also the same purport is formed or structured differently 
in different languages. What determines its form is solely the functions 
of the language, the sign function and the functions deducible therefrom. 
Purport remains, each time, substance for a new form, and has no 
possible existence except through being substance for one form or 
another.18 
We can see clearly that the linguistically formed content or “content-
form”, the process of signifying something in a certain form, is 
independent of the sense or content-purport. The linguistic content 
relates to sense in an arbitrary way and transforms it into a content-
substance. In other words: from the point of view of the purport, a 
                                                            
18 PTL, p. 70 / p. 52.  
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content-form is arbitrary. Hjelmslev illustrates this linguistic relativity 
also by referring to the color spectrum, as is often done in modern 
linguistics (and more broadly in cognitive sciences): the English green, 
French vert and Welsh glas have as a content-purport the color “itself” 
which the three languages designate by means of different words. The 
error to avoid is to think of the content-purport as one pre-existing 
object that is referred to in a structurally similar way by different 
languages. On the contrary: differences between languages do not rest 
on different realizations of a type of substance, but on different 
realizations of a principle of formation, or in other words, on a different 
form in the face of an identical but amorphous purport19. Content-
purport only appears as an area of purport that is formed as content-
substance and this appearing depends on the specific way in which a 
particular language carves up this purport. This carving up or 
“forming” process in a language refers to the semantic dimension of 
language, which concerns the conditions under which phrases can refer 
to something outside themselves, designate something extra-linguistic. 
This semantic feature of language is dependent on an arbitrary 
forming process rather than sense itself. Hjelmslev emphasizes this by 
defining content-substance in relation to content-form: «the substance 
depends on the form to such a degree that it lives exclusively by its 
favor and can in no sense be said to have independent existence»20. 
 The semiotic function or sign function is to add a form to a 
content, to constitute a content-form which, from the point of view of 
purport, is arbitrary, and which can only be explained by looking at 
its semiotic function, its sign function, that’s to say: the “solidary” 
interaction between a content and an expression21. In other words, a 
                                                            
19 PTL, p. 99 / p. 77. 
20 PTL, p. 68 / p. 50. 
21 This feature of language which makes it independent of motivation is also called 
the structural fact of double articulation, meaning that the signifying terms refer 
themselves to combinations of minimal, non-signifying elements (“phonemes”, which 
Hjelmslev calls “figures”) which don’t have any unity or value but distinctively.  
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sign in a language is constituted by a unit consisting of a content-
form that functions together with an expression-form – this function 
does not depend on purport but refers to it, again:  in an arbitrary 
way. Hjelmslev’s color example illustrates this nicely: 
In Welsh, ‘green’ is in part gwyrdd or glas, ‘blue’ is glas, ‘gray’ is glas or 
llwyd, ‘brown’ is llwyd. That’s to say, the part of the spectrum that is 
covered by our word green is intersected in Welsh by a line that assigns a 
part of it to the same area as our word blue while the English boundary 
between green and blue is not found in Welsh. Moreover, Welsh lacks the 
English boundary between blue and gray, and likewise the English 
boundary between gray and brown. On the other hand, the area that is 
covered by English gray is intersected in Welsh so that half of it is 
referred to the same area as our blue and half to the same area as our 
brown.22 
Hjelmslev gives the following schematic confrontation23 to illustrate 
the lack of coincidence between the boundaries: 
 
 gwyrdd 
green  
blue glas 
gray 
 
 
llwyd 
brown  
 
Let us now, before moving on to the relation between cinema and 
linguistic signification, briefly consider the differentiation between 
form, substance and purport within the expression plane, i.e. in the 
                                                            
22 PTL, p. 71 / pp. 52-53. 
23 Ibidem. 
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phonic order of semiosis. Hjelmslev defines expression-purport as an 
amorphous, unanalyzed sequence of sounds, which we can disclose 
by subtracting from a comparison of languages zones in the phonetic 
sphere, which are subdivided differently in different languages. 
Expression-purport is «a phonetico-physiological sphere of 
movement, which can of course be represented as spatialized in 
several dimensions, and which can be presented as an unanalyzed 
but analyzable continuum»24. Different languages graft in an 
arbitrary way a different yet essentially limited number of 
phonemes (“figures”) out of this amorphous zone. That this is done 
differently and arbitrarily can be understood through the example of 
the continuum made by the median profile of the roof of the mouth, 
from the pharynx to the lips. While for instance languages familiar 
to English mostly divide this zone into three areas, a back k-area, a 
middle i-area, and a frond p-area, Eskimo and Lettish (among 
others) distinguish two k-areas whose lines of division do not 
coincide in the two languages. 
 The constitution of a linguistic sign requires from the point of 
view of expression that the expression-purport be formed into an 
expression-substance, which it can do only through the existence of 
an expression-form. An expression-substance is a sound-sequence 
pronounced in a particular language, by an individual person, hic et 
nunc, for example the sound [bwa]. Such a particular pronunciation 
only exists qua substance by virtue of its relationship to an 
expression-form, i.e. by being the substance for a form. The latter, 
the expression-form, then, is a sound-sequence, which is interpreted 
within a particular language in terms of phonemes by which this 
language carves up and selects from the complete range of possible 
human vocalizations. As Taverniers explains: «The phonemic 
                                                            
24 PTL, p. 73 / p. 54. Note that from a linguistic point of view expression-purport is 
analyzable only as formed expression-substance, not as a pure, pre-signifying phonet-
ico-physiological sphere of movement “in itself”.  
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(formal) nature of sound is in turn determined by its being linked to 
a content. In other words, also in the expression plane, “form” is 
characterized in relation to the sign function: an expression-form is 
defined by forming a connection with a content-form and in this way 
constituting a sign»25. 
 Taverniers summarizes Hjelmslev’s characterization of the 
form-substance-purport triad within the two semiotic planes of 
content and expression in the following table26: 
 
 Purport 
(Matter/sense/BwO) 
Substance 
(Formed Matter) 
Form 
Content 
Plane 
Content-purport: Content-substance: Content-form: 
 
(thought) 
(signified) 
 
amorphous, unformed 
thought mass 
 
the ‘meaning’ of a sign in 
a particular context 
 
 
 
aspects of content 
defined in relation to 
other elements with-
in one language, and 
in relation to an ex-
pression plane 
  semantics  
Expression 
Plane 
Expression-purport: Expression-substance: Expression-form: 
 
(speech, sound) 
(signifier) 
 
amorphous, unformed 
sound sequence 
 
the pronounciation of a 
sound sequence by a par-
ticular person, hic et 
nunc 
 
phonemes: sound-
expressions defined 
in relation to ther 
sound-expressions 
within one language, 
and in relation ti a 
content plane 
 
  phonetics phonology 
 
Table 2: The form-substance-purport triad in relation to the content and expression planes  
of a semiotic sign 
 
To conclude this first section on the Prolegomena, we should underline 
the paradoxical intuition essential to modern linguistics that the sign 
is not only a sign for a content-substance but also for an expression-
                                                            
25 M. Taverniers, “Hjelmslev’s semiotic model of language: An exegesis”, cit., p. 18.  
26 Taken from M. Taverniers, “Hjelmslev’s semiotic model of language: An exegesis”, 
cit., p. 19, with slight alterations to match our Deleuzian context. 
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substance. The sound sequence [bwa], pronounced hic et nunc, is an 
entity of expression-substance which, by virtue of the sign and only by 
virtue thereof, is ordered to an expression-form and classified under it 
together with various other entities of expression-substance (other 
possible pronunciations, by other persons or on other occasions, of the 
same sign). This brings with it, as Hjelmslev puts it, that the sign is a 
two-sided entity with effect in two respects: “outwards” toward the 
expression substance and “inwards” toward the content-substance27. 
The word sign must from a linguistic point of view be used always as 
the unit consisting of content-form and expression-form and 
established by the solidarity that is called the sign function. The sign 
may not be used as the name for the expression or signifier only 
because this leads to the risk of favoring the widespread misconception 
according to which a language is simply a nomenclature or a stock of 
labels intended to be fastened on pre-existent things. As Saussure puts 
it:  
The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a 
sound-image. The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical 
thing, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the representation that 
is given to us by the evidence of our senses. The sound-image is sensory, 
and if I happen to call it “material”, this is only in that sense, and in 
opposition to the other term of the association, the concept, which is 
generally more abstract.28 
3. Between things and words 
For Deleuze the fundamental starting point of semiotics lies in 
Hjelmslev’s distinction between matter and substance. As we have 
seen, substance is formed matter or formed sense, it concerns only the 
objects that have a linguistic form. The passage to language always 
involves a transcoding, a transformation of initial characteristics of 
matter. Content-substance and expression-substance only exist and 
appear by virtue of forms being projected on to the purport, «just as an 
                                                            
27 PTL, p. 77 / p. 58. 
28 F. de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale, cit., p. 98 (my translation). 
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open net casts its shadow down on an undivided surface»29. Unlike 
Saussure’s contra-intuitive opposition between unformed and formed 
substance, Hjelmslev’s more abstract structure allows to distinguish 
purport as non-linguistically formed matter that is formed from 
physical, biological and phenomenological points of view30. For 
Hjelmslev the Saussurian distinction between substance and form is 
only legitimate from the point of view of the structural study of 
linguistic signification, whereas purport or sense itself must be studied 
by other disciplines in different ways.  
 This fundamental methodological distinction is also one of the 
main motives guiding Deleuze’s hypotheses on the bio-physical origin 
of language in The Logic of Sense. Deleuze distinguishes here a 
primary, dynamic genesis of noematic sense from a secondary, static 
genesis of propositional meaning. At the primary, emotive level of 
sense, the phonemic nature of sound cannot yet be analyzed in terms of 
a psychic imprint or signified content, but only in terms of a pre-
signifying, purely expressive function. Before signifying, phonemes 
designate for Deleuze a libidinal movement of the body. Their sense 
designates what he calls with Artaud a de-personalized, dis-unified 
experience of the body as “a body-without-organs”. Deleuze conceives 
this as the first in a series of orientational positions that a child’s 
psyche goes through during the first years of life. At this dynamic level 
of sense formation, a phoneme’s expression presupposes no mastery of 
language and still less a possession of writing31. In a similar sense, 
Deleuze and Guattari will later write in Anti-Oedipus that Hjelmslev’s 
linguistics enables a conception of phonemes as not merely effects of a 
                                                            
29 PTL, p. 76 / p. 57. 
30 PTL, p. 100 / pp. 77-78. 
31 G. Deleuze, Logique du sens, Les Éditions de Minuit, Paris 1969, p. 269 / G. 
Deleuze, The Logic of Sense (1969), transl. by M. Lester & C. Stivale, The Athlone 
Press, London 1990, p. 230. 
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signifier, but «schizzes, points-signs, or flows-breaks that collapse the 
wall of the signifier, pass through, and continue on beyond»32. 
 From a linguistic point of view, however, a sign is only a sign for 
an expression-substance and a content-substance, not for sense or 
purport itself. Thus Hjelmslev argues that if we want to uphold the 
intuitive, traditional sense in which a sign is a sign for something, we 
must reverse the sign-orientation: the linguistic sign is not a sign for 
something outside the sign itself – for example the Artaudean body-
without-organs – but for something that it can designate only by virtue 
of having interiorized it. For example, the word ring is a sign for that 
definite thing on my finger, but that thing itself, its sense, does not 
enter into the sign itself – as in the traditional, realist sense. That 
thing on my finger is from a linguistic point of view merely an entity of 
content-substance, which, through the sign, is ordered to a content-
form and is arranged under it together with various other entities of 
content-substance (e.g., the sound that comes from my telephone). That 
the word ring is a sign for that thing on my finger means that the 
content-form of the sign can subsume that thing as content-substance.  
 This distinction between the coded, logical conditions of 
linguistic signification and a form of pre-signifying expression is what 
is at stake in Deleuze’s discussion of the relations between cinema and 
language in The Time-Image. For Deleuze cinema, as all art in general, 
should induce a violent shock experience in which our experience 
becomes momentarily impersonal and dis-unified, similar to the child’s 
experience of the world prior to the formation of linguistic 
consciousness. Cinema must make language tend towards the “a-
signifying” as a general condition for the circulation of affects. Yet, this 
does not mean a total abolishment of the textual order of expression 
                                                            
32 G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, Capitalisme et schizophrénie 1. L’anti-Oedipe, Minuit, Pa-
ris 1972/1973, p. 292 / G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, Capitalism and Schizophrenia 1. Anti-
Oedipus (1972/1973), transl. by R. Hurley, M. Seem, H.R. Lane, University of Minne-
sota Press, Minneapolis 2000, p. 242. Henceforth abbreviated as A-O, with 
French/English page numbers. 
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and of its regulated, coded axes. Rather, Deleuze speaks of a 
simultaneous “reinvestment” of the material upon which language 
establishes its coded distinctions and unities: an energetic recharging 
of the expressive and connotative traits of this material that would 
make possible an opening of the “said” and of the “perceived” upon a 
seeing that would just as well be the “Outside” of language, as Deleuze 
puts it with Blanchot33.  
 He gives the example of Jean-Luc Godard’s formula on the usage 
of color in Week-end: «it’s not blood, it’s red»34. Color in the image no 
longer refers to a particular object but it fulfills an «almost 
carnivorous, devouring, destructive, absorbent function», it absorbs all 
that it can: «it is the power which seizes all that happens within its 
range, or the quality common to completely different objects»35. Our 
imaginary representations then de-metaphorize and de-figurate, not 
only to bodily intensity, but to pure matter. Although Deleuze still calls 
this a symbolism of colors, this does not consist in a correspondence 
between a color and an affect, as in the classic Kantian example of the 
white lily, which is not merely related to the concepts of color and of 
flower, but also awakens the idea of pure innocence. For Godard, the 
color is “the affect itself”: rather than inducing the spiritual calm of 
subjective self-reflection, the color prevents such distancing and works 
directly onto the nervous system. What can, indeed, be more 
materialist than the pure sensation of color, to that extent that 
Deleuze can state that the most immaterial of all arts, namely music, 
can only be re-incarnated through the subtle reintroduction of colors, 
through «a rudimentary and refined system of correspondence between 
sounds and colors», as with the composer Olivier Messiaen36.  
                                                            
33 See: IT, p. 228 / p. 175. 
34 IM, p. 166 / p. 118, IT, p. 238 / p. 182.  
35 IM, p. 166 / p. 118. 
36 G. Deleuze, Francis Bacon. Logique de la sensation (1981), Paris: Éditions du Seuil 
2002, p. 56. 
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 At the heart of this problematic lies the question whether or not 
the film’s shot can be considered as a minimal unit of meaning whose 
denotation is subject to linguistic analysis. Deleuze argues that 
although linguistic codes undeniably interfere with cinema’s 
narrativity, the cinematic image or sign cannot be reduced to a 
representation or signified because the shot cannot be considered an 
arbitrary sign: there is a motivated relation between the image and its 
sense. If one departs from the linguistic term as an unmotivated sign, 
this referential relation remains semiotically obscure: sense is only 
relevant in linguistics insofar as it is substance for a form. Thus, if we 
suppose the cinematic sign to render visible (or more generally: render 
sensible) that to which it refers, it cannot be considered as a linguistic 
sign function, because its value of being a sign depends entirely on 
being motivated. Let us take a closer look therefore at how Deleuze 
conceives the semiotic configuration of this motivated relation. 
4. Pure designation  
In Anti-Oedipus Hjelmslev’s «linguistics of flows»37 is staged in stark 
opposition to the structural conditions of Saussurian linguistics and 
post-Saussurian semiology. A second important appreciation of 
Hjelmslev appears in the third plateau of A Thousand Plateaus, where 
Hjelmslev’s form-substance-purport triad is explicitly valued. Deleuze 
and Guattari stage this distinction in their own terms as that between 
the Artaudean “body without organs” that is «permeated by unformed, 
unstable matters, by flows in all directions, by free intensities or 
nomadic singularities, by mad or transitory particles» and a “coding” or 
“territorializing” process of  “stratification” that consists of «giving form 
to matters, of imprisoning intensities or locking singularities into 
                                                            
37 A-O, pp. 291-292 / pp. 241-242. 
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systems of resonance and redundancy»38. In the context of Cinema 2, 
the passage in Anti-Oedipus is most valuable. 
 Deleuze and Guattari’s appreciation of Hjelmslev in 1973 is still 
brief and programmatic. Hjelmslev’s “linguistics of flows” is valued for 
proposing «a purely immanent theory of language» that causes «form 
and substance, content and expression to flow according to the flows of 
desire; and that breaks these flows according to points-signs and 
figures-schizzes»39. Unlike Saussure’s privileged role of the 
transcendent signifier, Hjelmslev’s linguistics is said to imply «the 
concerted destruction of the signifier”, constituting “a decoded theory of 
language»40. This “destruction” and “decoding” of the signifier is 
enacted by the attraction of motivation that prevents the structural 
fact of double articulation to establish itself. As we have seen, for the 
signifying terms to constitute themselves, these terms must refer only 
to combinations of minimal, non-signifying elements (phonemes) that 
themselves only have unity and value through distinction. It is only 
this structural organization – the arbitrary relation between the sign 
and purport – that isolates the linguistic sign from its referent, 
assuring its autonomy with regard to all motivation and making it 
independent of the temporality of the speaker and the situation41. If, on 
the contrary, the smallest unit of language were motivated, then 
signifying would not be distinguishable from expressing: content and 
expression would coincide and the structural condition of double 
articulation would collapse. The configuration of the signifier would 
then not be detachable from the situation in which the sign was 
produced: for example a cry, a rush of breath or a chanted melody. 
                                                            
38 G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2. Milles Plateaux, Minuit, 
Paris 1987, pp. 53, 54, 58 / G. Deleuze & F. Guattari, Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
2. A Thousand Plateaus, transl. by B. Massumi, University of Minnesota Press, Min-
neapolis-London 2005 (1987), pp. 40, 43. 
39 A-O, pp. 291-292 / pp. 242-243. 
40 Ibidem.  
41 Cfr. A-O, p. 248 / p. 207. 
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 Yet, it is one thing to stage this attraction of motivation as a 
decoding or destruction of the linguistic sign, but thereby this kind of 
excess of sense with regard to the organized significations of discourse 
has not itself been illuminated. In other words, the difficulty remains 
of inquiring the semiotic configuration of such excess. If, indeed, it is 
not intelligible in the categories of Saussurian linguistics, then how 
should we grasp its power of semiosis? To approach this difficulty 
Deleuze and Guattari turn to Jean-François Lyotard’s theory of pure 
designation in Discourse Figure, which they stage immediately after 
the passage on Hjelmslev as the first generalized critique of the 
signifier: 
The extreme importance of J.-F. Lyotard’s recent book is due to its 
position as the first generalized critique of the signifier. In his most 
general position, in fact, he shows that the signifier is overtaken towards 
the outside by figurative images, just as it is overtaken toward the inside 
by the pure figures that compose it – or, more decisively, by “the figural” 
that comes to short-circuit the signifier’s coded gaps, inserting itself 
between them, and working under the conditions of identity of their 
elements. In language and in writing itself, sometimes the letters as 
breaks, as shattered partial objects – and sometimes the words as 
undivided flows, as nondecomposable blocks, or full bodies having a tonic 
value – constitute assignifying signs that deliver themselves over to the 
order of desire: rushes of breath and cries.42 
To distinguish this order of a-signifying signs, which they also call «an 
order of connotation»43, from the signifying order fulfilling the 
structural conditions of post-Saussurian semiology, they follow 
Lyotard’s hypothesis of a libidinal order of pre-signifying signs that 
always “works” within each signifying order and that only rises to the 
surface when signification is problematized. Discussing the Hegelian 
theory of symbolism, Lyotard had begun Discourse Figure by arguing 
that there is an antecedence and heterogeneity between language’s 
referentiality – its designative force – and its signifying acts. As he 
writes:  
                                                            
42 A-O, p. 292 / p. 243. Cfr. A-O, pp. 244-245 / pp. 203-204.  
43 A-O, p. 244 / p. 203.  
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The exteriority of the object of which one speaks does not depend on 
signification, but on designation; it belongs to an experience that has no 
place in the system, but that is that of the speaker; it follows from a 
rupture, from a division that is the price to pay for the system of 
language to be utilizable. This exteriority is opened up by seeing and by 
desiring, in a retreat of sense that is just as old as every experience and 
every spoken word. (…) All signifying takes place in a space of 
designation that is both that of intentionality and that of distance (…), a 
profound exteriority that resides at the limit of discourse (…).44 
Just like Deleuze in The Logic of Sense, Lyotard calls this pre-
signifying designation of sense “expression”, as opposed to linguistic 
signification. The subordination of the phonic substance to the 
advantage of signification and transparent communication in the daily, 
pragmatic usage of language is in Lyotard’s view a neutralization and 
repression of this libidinal order of pre-signifying sense.45 This means 
that although it certainly still implicitly works within pragmatic 
language use, it is not experienced as such, remaining unexpressed, 
beneath the surface. Its explicit expression is for Lyotard exemplarily 
encountered in visual arts such as painting and sculpture, and arises 
through language itself when its regulated order is disturbed (eg. in 
poetry or in the free association of words in psychoanalytic practice)46. 
To distinguish these two kinds of expression or pre-signifying 
designation (visual and discursive), Lyotard reserves the terms “figure-
image” and “figure-form”: «In the face of discourse, there is the figure-
image; in discourse itself, there is the figure-form»47. 
The figure-form is said to be «the presence of non-language in 
language»48. It is something of another order that resides and works in 
discourse and confers upon it its expressivity. Like Hjelmslev, Lyotard 
gives a color example:  
                                                            
44 J.-F. Lyotard, Discours figure (1971), Éditions Klincksieck, Paris 1978, p. 50 (my 
translation). 
45 Deleuze and Guattari write in a similar sense that the signifier is “deterritorial-
ized” with regard to its surface of inscription: the signifier is a sign that can only re-
fer to other deterritorialized signs and that has lost its designative power, thereby 
cutting the user off from the flows of desiring production. 
46 J.-F. Lyotard, Discours figure (1971), cit., pp. 379-385. 
47 Ivi, p. 51 (my translation). 
48 Ibidem (my translation). 
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One may say that the tree is green, but one will not have put the color in 
the phrase. The color is sense. The negativity of signification escapes that 
of designation (…), the space of designation effectively inhabits discourse, 
but lies beyond what it signifies, in its expression. For now I call it the 
space of designation because its properties seem analogical to those of 
that spatiality, and contradict those of linguistic spatiality. Their 
common trait is the figure, we will call it the figural space.49 
This first phenomenological thesis of a sensory excess or “profound 
exteriority” that discourse always lacks in its signifying – because in 
order to do so it must interiorize it into its own (logical, coded) order – 
is further elaborated in the third chapter of Discourse Figure on the 
nature of the linguistic sign. In line with Hjelmslev’s thesis on the un-
determinability of purport or sense itself and Deleuze’s comments on 
Godard’s color use, Lyotard writes that «that “something” that must 
correspond to each enunciation is exactly not graspable, 
monopolizable» 50 from a linguistic point of view. It is always posited by 
the act of the spoken word, but posited beyond it, in a space created by 
an originary spatialization (“espacement”). To conceptualize how this 
non-linguistically formed sense can be expressed, Lyotard proposes a 
form of “pure designation” that must be distinguished both from the 
relation of signification (strictly linguistic) and from the relation of 
symbolization (rendering sensible an absent thing). He relies thereby 
on a hypothesis of the anthropologist André Leroi-Gourhan on the 
origin of language. Leroi-Gourhan considered the most primitive 
language as a pre-signifying instrument of expression: he considered 
signs originating in an emotive situation and conceived them as 
originally motivated. Given the central importance of this passage on 
the designative power of signs, we will cite it here at length: 
One should rather credit the strongly developed hypothesis of A. Leroi-
Gourhan: the most ancient language had a sacred function, the first 
meaningful, spoken unities were uttered by a narrator, who 
simultaneously designated by means of gestures the painted, 
corresponding figures during ceremonial processions that were followed 
                                                            
49 Ivi, p. 52 (my translation). 
50 Ivi, p. 74 (my translation). 
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by the tribe in temples-caverns. This is a very satisfying hypothesis 
because it captures the function of designation in all its force and 
specificity. The latter concerns two decisive traits: the word is not uttered 
in the absence of the designated thing, but in its presence; the designated 
thing is not a thing but a symbol, of which it is legitimate to state that it 
is right from the beginning opaque. This double trait of the situation in 
which the referential function is exercised permits us to isolate it 
precisely and to distinguish it from the symbolic. Instead of the word 
placing itself in front of the thing and putting up a screen in front of it, 
the word erases itself in order to manifest the thing. It is not a substitute 
that hides the thing, it is not itself a symbol that would re-present it by 
its proper substance or form, it is only in the experience of the speaker an 
opening to thing, a line of sight that makes the thing visible. There is 
thus certainly a distance from the word to that thing, from the utterance 
to its object in general, but that distance is not a depth to be traversed; 
much rather it is a depth in which the gesture indicates its object, it is 
the depth of the atmospheric spatiality, it presupposes light as the milieu 
in which visibility unfolds itself.51 
Lyotard breaks here not only with the Saussurian sign (unmotivated 
signification) but just as well with the Saussurian conception of the 
symbol (rendering sensible an absent thing), which is the classical 
alternative to the unmotivated character of the linguistic sign. 
Following Leroi-Gourhan’s surprising hypothesis, the word is neither 
conceived as a linguistic sign, nor as a symbol for an absent thing: the 
designative relation is not understood as if it would connect the sign-
symbol to the designated thing in its absence. Much rather, the sign-
orientation is exactly reversed: the indicative, referential force of the 
word derives from the fact that it is not a sign referring to something 
while representing it, as though the designated were absent, but the 
referential force of the word derives from the fact that it turns the 
thing itself into a symbol by designating it in its presence: a sign-thing. 
The designative force consists in making things sensible in their 
inaccessibility, in their opacity. The expressed phonemes of the 
narrator do not function as the basis for linguistic signification, they do 
not direct us at the “psychological imprint” of that sound, the 
representation that is given to us by the evidence of our senses, as in 
Saussure’s model, but once there is an expression, the designated itself 
                                                            
51 Ivi, p. 82 (my translation). 
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becomes an “a-signifying”, opaque sign. Signification, then, is thought 
as a secondary process that always takes place on the basis of this 
primary, designative relation. Deleuze and Guattari describe this in 
Anti-Oedipus as follows: 
Jean-François Lyotard has attempted to describe such a system [of 
connotation] in another context, where the word has only a designating 
function but does not of itself constitute the sign; what becomes a sign is 
rather the thing or body designated as such, insofar as it reveals an 
unknown facet described on it, traced by the graphism that responds to 
the word. The gap between the two elements is bridged by the eye, which 
“sees” the word without reading it, inasmuch as it appraises the pain 
emanating from the graphism applied to the flesh itself: the eye jumps. 
(…) Lyotard re-establishes the overly neglected rights of a theory of pure 
designation. He shows the irreducible gap between the word and the 
thing in the relationship of designation that connotes them. By virtue of 
this gap, it is the thing designated that becomes the sign by revealing an 
unknown facet as a hidden content. (Words are not themselves signs, but 
they transform into signs the things or bodies they designate.) At the 
same time it is the designating word that becomes visible, independently 
of any writing-reading, by revealing a strange ability to be seen, not 
read.52 
5. Conclusion 
A final remark will reveal how this reading of Lyotard informs 
Deleuze’s appreciation of Hjelmslev in Cinema 2. The essence of 
Lyotard’s theory of designation lies for Deleuze and Guattari in the 
independence or heterogeneity between the order of the visual (graphic 
expression) and the vocal, phonic expression. The graphic elements are 
not subordinated to a codifying process of signification – as the 
morphemes are in the constitution of the linguistic sign – but they 
reveal an “unknown facet”, namely their opacity and irreducible 
distance to the order of signification53. This opacity, in turn, is 
rendered visible and sensible due to the fact that the phonic expression 
                                                            
52 A-O, p. 245 / p. 204. 
53 Recounting an expression used by Merleau-Ponty, Jean Hyppolite speaks in a simi-
lar context of an impression given by art of “an ineffable which would be sense with-
out speech, and in relation to which we could say, in a paradoxical form, that speech 
is itself mute.” See: J. Hyppolite, Logique et existence (1953), P.U.F., Paris 1991, p. 29 
/ J. Hyppolite, Logic and Existence (1953), transl. by L.L. Lawlor and A. Sen, State 
University of New York Press, New York 1997, pp. 24-25. 
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remains heterogeneous to the graphic elements, thereby upholding its 
purely connotative, deictic force of designation. This emotive force is 
not neutralized or de-territorialized by syntagmatic and paradigmatic 
coding, but rather it is presented in its heterogeneity to these 
signifying structures. Whence Deleuze and Guattari’s wording of «a 
pain emanating from the graphism applied to the flesh itself»54.  
 It is in exactly the same sense that The Time-Image repeatedly 
puts forward «purely optical and sound situations» that become 
established through a so called «any-space-whatever» (“espace 
quelconque”), which designates a form of sense that is qualified while 
being “disconnected” and “emptied” of clearly attributable content55. 
Thus, in Deleuze’s terms cinematic semiosis is constructed upon a 
fundamental duality between two autonomous, heterogeneous planes of 
expression: a visual plane of pure, pre-linguistic images on the one 
hand and a phonic plane of pure, pre-signifying signs on the other 
hand56. Together, these two planes constitute what Deleuze calls «the 
utterable of a language system», which corresponds to Hjelmslev’s non-
linguistically formed sense (“purport”)57. Whilst every language system 
works through form and substance, cutting linguistic signification off 
from the pre-linguistically formed matter that makes up its raw 
material, cinema “reinvests” this material in images and signs. Such 
reinvestment consists essentially in a disturbance of signification that 
makes corporeal, rhythmic, affective sensorial features resurface as 
estranging symptoms. Using an expression of the psychopathologist 
Ludwig Binswanger, Deleuze writes that instead of prolonging itself 
into a speculative or pragmatic action (as in normal perception), 
cinema’s purely optical and sound situations induce a depersonalized 
experience in which the perceiver is «inhaled by the world»58. That 
                                                            
54 A-O, p. 245 / p. 204. 
55 IT, pp. 13, 27 / pp. 5, 16. 
56 Cfr. IT, pp. 329-341 / pp. 252-261. 
57 IT, p. 342 / p. 262. 
58 IT, p. 81, note 17/ p. 291, note 19.  
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such symptoms are estranging and incomprehensible does not mean 
that they are illusory, senseless, deprived of any content. Rather, they 
isolate a field of non-linguistically formed sense, which every 
intentional process of meaning constitution is projected upon, and 
which functions as a paradoxical immemorial condition that escapes 
that meaning itself: 
What the past is to time, sense is to language and idea to thought. Sense 
as past of language is the form of its pre-existence, that which we place 
ourselves in at once in order to understand images of sentences, to 
distinguish the images of words and even phonemes that we hear.59
                                                            
59 IT, p. 131 / p. 99. 
